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NOTE AND COMMENT
Court as agreed upon. The principal alleged basis for damages
in the Keller case was mental anguish resulting from certain
alleged slanderous statements; which might possibly be used as
a basis for explaining the Court's action therein in contrast
with many previous cases.' Actually, however, it has used re-
mittitur in many cases where the damages were no more cer-
tain.' It should further be noted that the case does not spe-
cifically modify any of the rules as to the conditions under
which remittitur may be applied, laid down in the recent cases
discussed above. It is therefore impossible to determine whether
this case augurs still a fourth period in the use of remittitur
in Montana.
-Harrington Harlow.
DAMAGES: LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR DELAY
IN AN ABANDONED CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
In a recent Federal case, the plaintiff contractor entered
into a contract to build a road for the defendant district. The
agreement provided that the contractor was to pay $500 per day
as liquidated damages for every working day elapsing between
the agreed and the actual completion dates. Twenty days after
the agreed date the plaintiff abandoned the work; new bids
were advertised and a new contractor started work after a de-
lay of 149 days and completed the work in 264 days. The court
allowed the defendant, under its cross-complaint, damages for
the 20 and 264 day periods at the stipulated rate but not for the
149 day period that the employer was looking for a new con-
tractor.!
In holding that the liquidated damage provision is applic-
able even where there has been a total abandonment of work by
the contractor, the principal case rejects the view of the earlier
cases and Williston's original view.' Under the old theory as
"" . . . the amount of an award in a slander case depends so greatly
upon the effect of the slander on the plaintiff . . . " Keller v. Safe-
way Stores, Inc. (1940) 111 Mont. 28, 108 P. (2d) 605, 614.
'
0In fact in most of the cases the court itself frankly admits the impossi-
bility of definitely determining the effect of the Injury on the plain-
tiff. Tanner v. Smith (1934) 97 Mont. 229, 33 P. (2d) 547; Ashley v.
Safeway Stores Inc., (1035) 100 Mont. 312, 47 P. (2d) 53.
'Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District No. 13 of State
of California (1938) 24 F. Supp. 346, affirmed 110 F. 2d 620, re-
versed on other grounds 311 U. S. 180, 85 L. Ed. 114, 61 S. Ct. 186.
2WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. Vol. 3, 1935) §785, P. 2210. But see
1941 Cum. Supp. §785, P. 44 wherein the rule of the principal case is
approved as preferable to the old, apparently not recognizing still an-
other possible alternative use of the clause.
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originally stated if the provision was not applicable as part of
the contract it was not applicable for any purpose ;' and the rule,
that such a provision contemplates a breach by mere delay but
not a breach by abandonment, was supported by the conclusion
that the breach finally materializing was not apposite to the
intention of the parties,' and by an initial presumption that such
a subordinate clause is limited by the period of time the parties
attempt to perform under the main contract.' This position is
entirely consistent with the uniform tendency of the older com-
mon law to construe strictly liquidated damage clauses.' How-
ever, the older view was often unjust in practical application,
in that the employer did not receive any damages for the delay.'
This objection has sometimes been stated thus: "The older
view, then, is anomalous in that the more flagrant the breach
and the greater likelihood of delay, the more difficult it will be
for the owner to recover for the delay he was guarding
against. "'
Such objections resulted in the rule asserted in the principal
case that a per diem clause applies even though the contract is
abandoned. However, this rule has not been applied absolutely,
but the courts have imposed a standard of reasonableness as to
what delay after abandonment will be deemed subject to the
clause.' But, on whatever grounds the per diem clause may be
'Bacigalupi et al. v. Phoenix Bldg. & Const. Co. et al. (1910) 14 Cal.
App. 632, 112 P. 892.
'Moses v. Autuono (1918) 56 Fla. 449, 47 So. 925, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.)
350.
6Watson v. DeWitt County (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 150, 46 S. W.
1061. This case has been cited in other decisions as authority for the
newer line of decisions. The case allowed liquidated damages only
from completion date until the contractor formally abandoned the con-
tract, i.e., only so long as performance under the contract continued,
and therefore, it is not authority for the proposition that the clause
is applicable even after the contract is abandoned. See note 9. infra.
'City of Rainier v. Masters (1916) 79 Ore. 534, 154 P. 426, L. R. A.
1916E 1175: "Forefitures are to be strictly construed, and he who
would avail himself of them must bring himself precisely within the
letter of the contract authorizing them." MCCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935)
§147, P. 600; ELrior'r, CONTRACTS (1913) Vol. 2, §1559, P. 848.
'Supra note 3; Shields v. John Shields Const. Co. (1913) 81 N. J. E.
286, 86 Atl. 958.
'Liquidated Damages-Clause Relating to Delay Held Applicable Where
Contractor Abandons Work (1938) 52 HARv. L. REV. 160.9Supra note 1; Southern Pac. Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1927) 21 F.
2d. 288; MCCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935) p. 155 (approves Southern Pac.
case). It is not altogether clear whether Williston intends to say that
a per diem damage clause should not apply for any purpose where
there is finally an abandonment, or simply that it should not be ap-
plied to any time elapsing after the actual abandonment. The South-
ern Pac. Co. case interprets it as declaring that the plaintiff should not
recover under the contract clause even for the period of time elapsing
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deemed to control in case of an abandonment, it would seem
that it should include a reasonable period of time to secure a
new contractor.' Surely, if abandonment has any place in the
intentions of the parties, it is difficult to see why they would
not intend the clause to cover that period. Nevertheless the
principal case, and others," refuse compensation for that delay.
The lack of uniformity in the decisions and discontent ex-
pressed in the opinions in both lines of authority raise the query
whether a still better rule may not be formulated. It is submit-
ted that, instead of approaching the problem from a contract
standpoint, a fairer result would be reached by admitting the
clause for whatever evidentiary value it may have, under the
facts of the particular case, of the per day rate of actual dam-
age caused to the employer. Treating it in this manner the
question will always be: "What are the real damages" for the
delay? Under this rule the employer would be permitted to
prove greater damage, or the contractor would be permitted to
prove that the employer suffered less damage, than the amount
stipulated for. In the absence of such proof the court would
treat the provision as the best evidence available, unless so clear-
ly out of line as to amount to a penalty. Surely, when from
the nature of the case it would be impracticable or extremely
difficult to fix the actual damage, which is the very basis for
enforcing liquidated damages, the contracting parties by agree-
ment could estimate better than anyone else the damage suf-
fered." Their agreement to guard against that loss should be
given full consideration to that extent.
Such an approach would undoubtedly bring up many ob-
jections to its use, some of which can be forseen and others not.
If we consider the question to be, "What are the real damages
from loss of use," presumably the general rules governing dam-
ages for breach of a contract will control. So, one might well
ask, "Are the damage items covered by the per diem damage
clause of such character that, but for the binding nature of the
between the completion date and the abandonment date. This supposed
aspect of Williston's rule is a strongly contributing factor in causing
the Court in the Southern Pac. case to repudiate that rule. On prin-
ciple it seems that the clause should govern strictly, so long as per-
formance under the contract is being attempted.
1Supra note 8.
"Southern Pac. Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co. supra note 9.
28upra note 1; Board of Education v. Sandman (1929) 134 Misc. 456,
234 N. Y. Supp. 665, affirmed 229 App. Div. 853, 243 N. Y. Supp. 805.
"SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (1916) §283, P. 843, quoting Chief Justice Best
in Crisdee v. Bolton, 3 C. P. 240
"I think that parties to contracts, knowing exactly their own
situations and objects, can better appreciate the consequences of
their failing to obtain these objects than either judges or juries."
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contract, the law won't recognize them, as being too indefinite
and uncertain?" If they are, of course there would be no place
for evidence pertaining to such items. Hence, as evidence, our
clause would be irrelevant to the issue of damages.
It may be well to stop at this point and determine the pur-
pose or function of a provision guarding against these particular
damages. The courts have not been careful to analyze the pro-
vision but have followed the aphorism of Williston,1' or the new
line of authority, without further inquiry into its nature.' The
provision is intended to cover those cases where from the nature
of the contract and of the breach the actual damages are diffi-
cult to compute mathematically, though the fact of there being
substantial injury be established. The provision is, in final
analysis, intended to cover those damages caused by the loss of
use." Loss of use includes those items such as compensation for
loss of enjoyment," change of position of the parties to their
detriment in reliance upon the completion date,' rental" and any
other damage the owner may suffer by failing to have the use
of the property which is being constructed.' At least some of
these damages from their nature are difficult to ascertain or
expensive to compute. Yet, they are as real as those that may
be easily reduced to mathematical certainty.'
"Village of Canton v. Globe Indem. Co. (1922) 201 App. D. 820, 195
N. Y. Supp. 445.
"Clemente Const. Corporation et al. v. P. T. Cox Contracting Co., Inc.(1939) 172 Misc. 904, 16 N. Y. Supp. 483. However, in McKegney v.
Illinois Surety Co. (1917) 180 App. Div. 507, 167 N. Y. Supp. 843, the
court recognizes there may be special loss by reason of delay.
"Streeper v. Williams (1865) 48 Pa. 450.
"Supra note 16, 48 Pa. at P. 455; City of Bristol v. Bostwick (1922)
146 Tenn. 205, 240 S. W. 774.
"Supra note 16, 48 Pa. at P. 455.
"If the employer were intending to rent the building when completed
to a third party, then the damages, under most circumstances, would
be easily computable and there would be no basis for applying the pro-
vision. However, If the delay should cause him to lose a more desir-
able tenant than he should obtain thereafter, then there is some rea-
son to apply the clause to cover his disappointment and whatever in-
convenience the new tenant may cause. In rental cases the provision
would be most applicable where the employer intends to occupy the
premises himself and has given up his old lease or made other prep-
arations in reliance thereon. In such cases it would cover any rental
paid elsewhere plus the damage caused by extra moving, such as de-
struction and loss of household goods, time spent in locating a place
In which to live in the interim and those innumerable other losses at-
tendant upon such moving. Where some items are readily computable
and some are not, common sense will dictate the manner and extent to
which our clause will be used as evidence of real damages.
'Edward E. Gustin & Co. v. Neb. Bldg. and Inv. Co. et al. (1923) 110
Neb. 241, 193 N. W. 269.
'"Southern Menhaden Co. v. How et al. (1916) 71 Fla. 128, 70 So. 1000,
McKegney v. Illinois Surety Co. spra note 15.
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There is little suggestion in the cases applying the per diem
damage clause to abandoned contracts as a binding provision of
the contract, that they do so because the employer could recover
nothing otherwise. As a matter of fact, there is little in the
general statements found in the cases or the authorities, as to
the relationship of liquidated damage clauses to the general law
of damages, suggesting that such clauses are a means of giving
effect to damages which otherwise would not be recoverable be-
cause of their uncertainty in amount.'
It is possible that under Montana's applicable Code Sec-
tions the suggested objection might be pressed further than
would seem justified under the cases.
R. C. M. 1935, Section 8668 provides:
No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract
which are not clearly ascertainable in both their nature
and origin.
R. C. M. 1935, Section 7556 provides:
Every contract by which the amount of damage to be
paid, or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an
obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof, is to that
extent void, except as expressly provided in the next section.
And R. C. M. 1935, Section 7557 provides:
Exception-The parties to a contract may agree therein
upon an amount which shall be presumed to be an amount
of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the
nature of the case, it would be impracticable or extremely
difficult to fix the actual damage.
However, it would seem that these sections can best be harmon-
ized simply by interpreting them as being declaratory of the
common law. That is, Section 8668 requires that substantial
damages actually be sustained, and that they be the conse-
quences of the defendant's breach. Section 7557 is a special ap-
plication of Section 8668, in that it provides for a special meth-
od for determining the measure of certain damages fully satisfy-
ing the requirements of certainty of their existence and causal
"A Pennsylvania case may be thought inconsistent with this statement.
Streeper v. Williams, supra note 16, suggests that because of the cir-
cumstances and nature of the breach it may have been the Intention
of the parties to stipulate those damages which would not otherwise
be recoverable under the general rules of damages. Even if it be
thought that the law of damages in the past did not directly permit
recovery for the bulk of those items covered by a per diem delay
clause, it is submitted that to so allow recovery whenever provided
for by mutual agreement of the parties, except as modified by proof
of the actual damages, would be a desirable development in the law of
damages.
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connection required by Section 8668, but the measure of which is
uncertain because of their special character.'
If we grant that the real question in every case of abandon-
ment is "What are the real damages?", another objection may
be raised, stated in somewhat this form: "How can the parties'
approximation or compromise agreement as to what is a reason-
able stipulated sum for each day's delay, arrived at months be-
fore the breach, be relevant even, in establishing the real dam-
ages flowing from abandonment?" The answer to this objection
turns on the nature of the fact sought to be proved. If that
fact were susceptible of direct proof, resulting in a simple math-
ematical computation, the objection raised would be tenable. In
fact, though, the basic assumption as to this particular kind of
damage is that it will be no more susceptible of exact ascertain-
ment after breach than before. Hence, as is well stated in Suth-
erland on Damages:"
"Where a contract is of such a character that the dam-
ages which must result from a breach of it are uncertain in
their nature and not susceptible of proof by reference to any
pecuniary standard, it is deemed especially fit that the par-
ties should liquidate them, and any stipulation they make
ostensibly for that purpose receives favorable considera-
tion."
As suggested above, the amount stipulated in the per diem
damage clause is likely to be simply a compromise between two
divergent views or opinions as to how much the owner may be
damaged for loss of use. Hence, it is rather difficult to fit it
into any of the recognized categories of evidence. However,
it may be objected that this is opinion evidence and should be
excluded on that ground. But, according to Wigmore it is not a
matter of opinion at all; rather is it a question of testimonial
qualification under which either party might well be termed an
expert.' Even though the court should treat this as opinion evi-
dence it still might be admitted as an opinion of value.' Anoth-
er evidentiary objection might be that this clause does not sat-
isfy the Best Evidence Rule, and so should be excluded. Of
course, much would depend upon what the particular court con-
strues the Best Evidence Rule to mean; but, if Wigmore's inter-
pretation be accepted, one could not successfully object to it on
this ground.' Further, it may be argued that the clause should
mMcCoRMIcK, DAMAGES (1935) §148, Notes 23 and 24, P. 606.
"SUTHERIAND, DAMAGES (1916) Vol. 1. §289, P. 868.
"WiGMoRE, EvmENC (1940) §557, P. 637.
'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1940) §1923, P. 21 and §1940, P. 47.
'WIGMOPB, EVIDENCE (1940) §§1173, 1174.
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be admitted as an admission.' Whether or not that is correct, it
is submitted that there are no insurmountable evidentiary objec-
tions to the use of this provision as the best evidence available
of the damage for loss of use.
Treating the clause as the best evidence available is not a
pure invention. It is a formulation of a rule that the courts
may have been applying but not recognizing. The principal case
allows damages only for the period of time which it thinks
"fair," saying that "obviously, the per diem arrangement does
not run during the entire period of delay." In other words, it
allows damages at the stipulated rate only for the period of
time which it thinks reasonable under the circumstances, and
as there is no evidence to the contrary this will be the amount
of damage suffered. A Texas Court allowed recovery for part
of the delay, "there being no evidence of the amount of actual
damages," and the court did not see any reason why it should
not apply the provision as such." A Kansas Court allowed the
employer what it thought was a reasonable length of time under
the circumstances within which to make new arrangements.'
Another case held that the employer was entitled to claim dam-
ages at the stipulated rate for such delay as directly resulted
from the original contractor's abandonment of the work, such
period of time to be shown as a matter of evidence at the trial."
Perusal of these cases makes it apparent that the courts are
willing to accept the per day rate of damage, but only for such
length of time as it deems reasonable under the circumstances,
and the result in each falls squarely within the proposed rule of
best evidence. However, no evidence of actual damage for loss
of use was submitted, and it does not appear in the reports that
any such offer was made in the foregoing cases. If the liqui-
dated per day rate is applied as a binding provision of the con-
tract such evidence is not pertinent, but that these cases did not
intend any such result, is strongly suggested in National Loan
and Exchange Bank v. Gustafson,' in which the Court said:
gVWIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (1940) §§1048, 1049.
'Kaufman et u.. v. Christian-Watham Lumber Co. et at. (1916) 184
S. W. 1045.
"School District No. 3 v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.
(1915) 96 Kan. 499, 152 P. 668. The employer waited 4 months, 21
days before hiring a new contractor to complete. In computing the
period for allowing damages for delay, the court decided, having in
mind all the circumstances of the case, that 1 month and 21 days
was a reasonable period. The result is justified by the duty to miti-
gate. SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (1916) §149, P. 458.
'City of Reading v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1937)
19 Fed. Supp. 350.
-(1930) 157 S. C. 221, 154 S. E. 167.
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"Certainly if the $30.00 per day clause for delay does
not apply, as such, it does fix a measure for the damages
which would be suffered by the school district in the event
the building was not completed in accordance with the terms
of the contract. This measure of damages was agreed upon
by the parties and on account of the uncertainty and the im-
possibility of applying the ordinary rules in measuring
damages, I think that this clause in the contract affords the
safest and most equitable rule to apply."
If the provision is to be applied only to delays which the
court thinks reasonable, why not forget all about binding pro-
visions of contracts, and simply treat the provision as the best
evidence available, under the circumstances, of the damages for
loss of use to the employer?
-Bjarne Johnson.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF COUNTIES
FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF
THEIR EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS.
In Jacobey v. Chouteau County,' the defendant county main-
tained a ferry for use of the general public crossing the Mis-
souri river. In the winter time when a boat could not be used,
the defendant provided a basket or aerial carrier operated
upon a long cable. On the south side of the river there was
constructed and maintained a tower near the embankment of
the river to sustain the cable, and an elevated platform to pro-
vide means of getting into or on the basket. Plaintiff, desiring
to cross the river, went up the tower to the platform and await-
ed the approach of the basket; and while he was on: the plat-
form the tower collapsed and fell, causing injury to him. De-
fendant was charged with negligence in the construction and
maintenance of the tower. The court held that the county was
liable for the injury sustained by the plaintiff; that the coun-
ty was acting in a proprietary capacity in operation of the
ferry; and that there was evidence from which the jury was
warranted in finding active negligence on the part of the of-
ficers of defendant county, so that it was not necessary to de-
termine whether a county's liability is limited to cases of ac-
tive negligence. In thus holding counties liable for torts of
its officers and employees when engaged in proprietary, but
not governmental functions, the court followed Johnson v. City
of Billings.!
1(1941) ...... Mont ........ 112 P. (2d) 1068.2(1936) 100 Mont. 462, 54 P. (2d) 579, 75 A. L. R. 1196.
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